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Abstract
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FOR INFRARED DETECTORS
Arne H. Raima
MISSION RESEARCH CORPORATION
4935 North 30th Street
Colorado Springs, Colorado
One important issue facing space systems is survivability and operability in radia-
tion environments. All space systems will be subject to the natural space environment,
and most DoD and SDI systems must also be concerned with the much higher radiation
environments produced by nuclear weapons. As a result, survivability and operability
are necessary requirements that must be met by any space system.
Historically, infrared detectors (which are the key component in sensor subsys-
tems) have been very vulnerable to nuclear radiation exposure. Most semiconductor
components are subject to a variety of radiation-induced degradation mechanisms,
and infrared detectors are no exception. In addition, high-quality infrared detectors
are extremely sensitive detectors of optical photons, but this also makes them very
sensitive to gamma photons, electrons, and protons.
Although some infrared detector technologies are less vulnerable to nuclear radi-
ation than others, and hardening approaches have been developed for some of the
technologies, there is no realistic expectation that the vulnerability problem will be
completely eliminated for any infrared detector technology. Therefore, it is necessary
to understand the vulnerability issues presented by nuclear radiation exposure, so that
ones that impact sensor performance can be addressed.
In this paper, we will describe the most important radiation response issues for
infrared detectors. In general, the two key degradation mechanisms in infrared detec-
tors are the noise produced by exposure to a flux of ionizing particles (e.g.; trapped
electrons and protons, debris gammas and electrons, radioactive decay of neutron-
activated materials) and permanent damage produced by exposure to total dose.
Total-dose-induced damage is most often the result of charge trapping in insulators or
at interfaces. Exposure to short pulses of ionization (e.g.; prompt x-rays or gammas,
delayed gammas) will cause detector upset. However, this upset is not important to a
sensor unless the recovery time is too long. A few detector technologies are vulnerable
to neutron-induced displacement damage, but fortunately most are not.
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We will discuss the radiation responses of various infrared detector technologies,
emphasizing where possible the responses of the newer technologies that are the subject
of the Workshop. Because of the newness of most of these technologies, much of this
will be analytical projections of the radiation response. In some cases, we will not
even be able to accomplish the analytical predictions because of a lack of sufficient
information about the use of the technology as an infrared detector. We will compare
the responses of the newer technologies with those of the mainstream technologies of
PV HgCdTe and IBC Si:As. One important reason for this comparison is to note where
some of the newer technologies have the potential to provide significantly improved
radiation hardness compared with that of the mainstream technologies, and thus to
provide greater motivation for the pursuit of these technologies.
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RADIATION HARDNESS IS A BASIC REQUIREMENT, NOT
AN ADD-ON, FOR SPACE SYSTEMS
• NATURAL SPACE RADIATION ENVIRONMENT EXISTS AT ALL TIMES
• NATURAL RADIATION ENVIRONMENT AROUND EARTH MAY BE
RELATIVELY BENIGN, BUT LONG-DURATION MISSIONS CAN
ACCUMULATE HIGH DOSE
• NASA MISSIONS TO OUTER PLANETS CAN ENCOUNTER RADIATION
ENVIRONMENTS MUCH HIGHER THAN EARTH'S
• SDI AND DoD SYSTEMS MUST SURVIVE THE NUCLEAR-ENHANCED
ENVIRONMENTS
• IR DETECTORS WILL HAVE TO BE HARD, OR THEY WILL NOT BE
USED FOR SPACE APPLICATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN THE SDS
• ONE SHOULD NO LONGER ASSUME THAT ONE CAN DEVELOP A
COMPONENT OR SUBSYSTEM, AND THEN THINK ABOUT HARDENING
• HARDENING MUST BE CONSIDERED FROM THE BEGINNING
Mission Research Corporation
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THERE ARE SEVERAL RADIATION HARDNESS ISSUES
THAT ARE IMPORTANT
• OPERABILITY DURING EXPOSURE TO A FLUX OF IONIZING
PARTICLES
• TRAPPED ELECTRONS OR PROTONS, DEBRIS GAMMAS OR ELECTRONS,
DECAY OF ACTIVATED MATERIALS, ETC.
• SURVIVABILITY FOLLOWING TOTAL-DOSE EXPOSURE
• TRAPPED ELECTRONS OR PROTONS, PROMPT X-RAYS OR GAMMAS,
DELAYED OR SECONDARY GAMMAS, ETC.
• UPSET/RECOVERY WHEN EXPOSED TO PROMPT PULSE
• SURVIVABILITY FOLLOWING NEUTRON EXPOSURE
• ISSUES THAT ARE MORE SYSTEM-RELATED WILL NOT BE DISCUSSED
• OPERABILITY IN THE PRESENCE OF NUCLEAR-INDUCED OPTICAL
CLUTTER
• RECOOLING FOLLOWING NUCLEAR-INDUCED HEATING
• SGEMP/IEMP
OPERABILITY IN A GAMMA-FLUX ENVIRONMENT
REMAINS A KEY ISSUE FOR INFRARED SENSORS
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DETECTORS ARE SO SENSITIVE
THAT CHARGE DEPOSITED BY A
SINGLE IONIZING PARTICLE
CAN COMPLETELY MASK THE
OPTICAL SIGNAL
• DETECTORS ARE RELATIVELY
LARGE, SO EVENT RATES
ARE HIGH
• ALL PIXELS CAN BE
CONTAMINATED AT
RELATIVELY LOW FLUX
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IONIZATION-INDUCED PULSES IN LWIR DETECTORS
ARE PARTICULARLY LARGE
' l ' l ' I ' I ' I
HgCdTe
• DETECTORS ARE VERY SENSITIVE
ANALOG DEVICES
• PULSES PRODUCED BY IONIZING
PARTICLES CAN COMPLETELY
MASK OPTICAL SIGNALS
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• EFFECT IS TRANSIENT, AND
OCCURS ONLY WHEN DETECTORS
ARE EXPOSED TO FLUX
SELECTION OF DETECTOR TECHNOLOGY CAN IMPACT
OPERABILITY IN IONIZING-FLUX ENVIRONMENT
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HIGHER a FOR THINNER
DETECTORS
• EXTRINSIC DETECTORS FOR
HIGHER ep
• ADVANCED HARDENING
CONCEPTS ARE MORE
LIKELY FOR EXTRINSIC
DETECTORS
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153 ORSG1NAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
MANY OF THESE INNOVATIVE DETECTOR CONCEPTS
GIVE PROMISE OF IMPROVED HARDNESS TO IONIZING
PARTICLE FLUX
• PRIMARY ADVANCE IS
DETECTOR THINNESS
• MOST OF CURVES BASED ON
ANALYTICAL PREDICTIONS
• GaAs/AlGaAs QUANTUM WELL
CURVE BASED ON EXPERI-
MENTAL DATA
»
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RELATIVE OAUMA FLUX
SURVIVABILITY FOLLOWING TOTAL-DOSE EXPOSURE IS
ALSO AN IMPORTANT ISSUE
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DAMAGE MECHANISM IS
TRAPPING OF RADIATION-
INDUCED CHARGE IN
INSULATORS OR AT
INTERFACES
• DAMAGE IS
PERMANENT
• NARROW-BANDGAP SEMI-
CONDUCTORS ARE
PARTICULARLY VULNER-
ABLE TO TUNNELING
EFFECTS
• HIGH IMPEDANCE DEVICES
ARE PARTICULARLY VULNER-
ABLE TO SURFACE LEAKAGE
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DETERMINING TOTAL-DOSE HARDNESS OF ANY
TECHNOLOGY USUALLY ACCOMPLISHED ONLY BY
EXPERIMENT
10-2
MOST SEMICONDUCTOR
TECHNOLOGIES WITH
INSULATORS ARE VULNER-
ABLE TO TOTAL DOSE
• INCLUDES Si, Ge, AND
MOST IH-Va
• PINNED SURFACE
POTENTIAL MAKES
GaAs AN EXCEPTION
• HARDENING APPROACHES
CAN BE DEVELOPED
• TUNNELING MAKES
PROBLEM MORE DIF-
FICULT FOR NARROW
BANDGAP MATERIALS
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HARDENING OF HgCdTe AGAINST TOTAL-DOSE
EXPOSURE HAS PROVEN TO BE PARTICULARLY
DIFFICULT
• DAMAGE MECHANISM NOT
WELL UNDERSTOOD
• ANY OF SEVERAL
DIFFERENT MECHANISMS
CAN DOMINATE
OBSERVED DAMAGE
• STANDARD HARDENING
APPROACHES HAVE NOT
BEEN EFFECTIVE
• HARDNESS HAS NOT
BEEN REPEATABLE
• VARIATION IN HARDNESS
OFTEN OBSERVED IN
SAME ARRAY
• ONE QUESTION IS WHETHER
SIMILAR PROBLEMS WILL BE
ENCOUNTERED FOR ANY NARROW-
BANDGAP SEMICONDUCTOR
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RECOVERY TIME IS KEY ISSUE FOR PROMPT-PULSE
EXPOSURE
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SECONDS FROM TRIGGER (iKT2)
UPSET THRESHOLD IS SO
LOW THAT UPSET IS SURE
TO OCCUR
• ISSUE IS RELATIVELY
INDEPENDENT OF
DETECTOR TECHNOLOGY
• SYSTEMS MUST BE
DESIGNED TO
IGNORE THIS UPSET
RECOVERY, ESPECIALLY
IN MULTI-BURST ENVIRON-
MENT, IS KEY
READOUT OFTEN GOVERNS
RECOVERY OF FPA, BUT
DETECTOR RECOVERY MUST
BE CONSIDERED
• RECOVERY AT
CRYOGENIC
TEMPERATURE
CAN BE LONG
MOST DETECTOR TECHNOLOGIES ARE RELATIVELY
HARD TO NEUTRON EXPOSURE
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RELATIVE NEUTRON FLUENCE
PERMANENT DEGRADATION
PRODUCED BY NEUTRON-
INDUCED DISPLACEMENTS
Si:X AND InSb ARE
EXCEPTIONS
ANALYTICALLY PREDICTING
THE NEUTRON RESPONSE OF
A NEW TECHNOLOGY IS
DIFFICULT
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SUMMARY
RADIATION HARDNESS IS ONE OF THE BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR
LWIR DETECTOR TECHNOLOGIES DEVELOPED FOR SPACE
APPLICATIONS
IONIZING-PARTICLE-FLUX AND TOTAL-DOSE HARDNESS ARE THE
MOST IMPORTANT OPERABILITY/SURVIVABILITY ISSUES
• THESE ISSUES EXIST FOR BOTH NATURAL-SPACE AND NUCLEAR-
WEAPON-ENHANCED ENVIRONMENTS
RECOVERY FOLLOWING PROMPT-PULSE EXPOSURE AND
SURVIVABILITY FOLLOWING NEUTRON EXPOSURE ARE SECONDARY
ISSUES FOR MOST DETECTOR TECHNOLOGIES
• RECOVERY TIME IN MULTI-DURST ENVIRONMENT CAN BE IMPORTANT
• THESE ISSUES ONLY EXIST FOR NUCLEAR-WEAPON-
ENHANCED ENVIRONMENTS
MANY OF THE PROPOSED INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGIES HAVE
POTENTIAL HARDNESS ADVANTAGES OVER THE EXISTING
MAINSTREAM TECHNOLOGIES OF HgCdTe AND IBC Si:As
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